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“One Giant Leap 
[Backwards] for Mankind”1 
LIMITED LIABILITY IN 
PRIVATE COMMERCIAL SPACEFLIGHT 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2014, six people aboard Virgin Galactic’s 
SpaceShipTwo will likely become the first paying customers to 
fly on a private commercial spacecraft.2 Passengers on that 
historic two-and-a-half hour flight3 will see “spectacular views”4 
 
 1 This is an abbreviated version of Neil Armstrong’s iconic first words as he 
“became the first person ever to step onto another planetary body.” Neil Armstrong: 
1930–2012, NASA (Aug. 25, 2012), http://www.nasa.gov/topics/people/features/
armstrong_obit.html. Armstrong’s words in their entirety were: “That is one small step 
for (a) man, one giant leap for mankind.” Id. 
 2 Overview: Spaceships, VIRGIN GALACTIC, http://www.virgingalactic.com/
overview/spaceships (last visited Aug. 19, 2013); Virgin Galactic Flexes SpaceShipTwo’s 
Unique Feather Mechanism in Second Supersonic Flight, VIRGIN GALACTIC (May 9, 2013), 
http://www.virgingalactic.com/news/item/virgin-galactic-flexes-spaceshiptwos-unique-
feather-mechanism-in-second-supersonic-flight; see Frans G. von der Dunk, Passing the 
Buck to Rogers: International Liability Issues in Private Spaceflight, 86 NEB. L. REV. 
400, 403 (2007–2008). With the exception of test flights for upcoming commercial 
spacecraft, all prior manned spaceflight has been aboard government-owned vehicles. 
See MATTHEW J. KLEINMAN ET AL., THE LAWS OF SPACEFLIGHT: A GUIDEBOOK FOR NEW 
SPACE LAWYERS 39-45, 48 (2012); see also Clara Moskowitz, Suborbital Space Ready to 
Take Flight, Experts Say, SPACE.COM (June 25, 2012), http://www.space.com/16291-
suborbital-space-research-flights.html (“While the [commercial spaceflight] companies 
have been conducting test flights, none have yet flown a commercial mission.”). SpaceX 
has the distinction of being the only company to launch a commercial spacecraft that 
has docked with the International Space Station, but the capsule was unmanned. 
Victoria Jaggard & Ker Than, SpaceX’s Dragon Captured By Space Station—A First, 
NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (May 25, 2012), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2012/05/
120525-spacex-dragon-robot-arm-international-space-station-nation. 
 3 The flight will be suborbital, which is “spaceflight where the spacecraft 
reaches outer space, but does not have sufficient energy to complete a full revolution 
around the Earth before reentering the atmosphere.” KLEINMAN ET AL., supra note 2, 
at 30. While “there is no international agreement on where outer space begins,” see von 
der Dunk, supra note 2, at 424, for the limited purposes of this discussion, suborbital 
flight, when it exceeds the Kármán Line, a distance 100 km above sea level, will be 
termed as spaceflight. KLEINMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 3. The Kármán Line is the 
“most commonly accepted demarcation between atmosphere and outer space.” Id. 
 4 Overview: Experience, VIRGIN GALACTIC, http://www.virgingalactic.com/
overview/experience (last visited Sept. 8, 2013). 
292 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:1 
of Earth and experience six minutes of weightlessness5 in what 
promises to be a life-changing experience.6 In that time, the 
spaceflight participants will be free to unstrap from their seats 
and “float, tumble, even get married.”7 But no amount of 
enthrallment can prevent the inevitable corollary to the private 
sector’s maiden spaceflight: the first commercial spaceflight-
related lawsuit.8 
As with any lawsuit, the ultimate issue will be liability.9 
And as with any previously unlitigated issue, the proceedings 
to determine liability will likely be “messy, expensive, and 
unpredictable.”10 Given the high costs of the initial flights,11 
 
 5 Virgin Galactic: Flame On, ECONOMIST (Apr. 29, 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2013/04/virgin-galactic; David Warmflash, 
About Those Space Joyrides . . . , AIR & SPACE MAG. (Jan. 6, 2012), available at 
http://www.airspacemag.com/space-exploration/About-Those-Space-Joyrides.html. 
 6 See Overview: Experience, supra note 4 (“[Y]ou know that life will never 
quite be the same again.”). 
 7 Warmflash, supra note 5. But some warn that permitting customers to 
freely maneuver in the cabin during suborbital flights could be dangerous. See, e.g., id. 
(“‘Unstrapping and re-strapping in such a short time frame would be a risky endeavor,’ 
says the company’s [XCOR, a private spaceflight company] communications 
representative, Mike Masse.”). 
 8 See, e.g., SIMON ADEBOLA ET AL., GREAT EXPECTATIONS—AN ASSESSMENT 
OF THE POTENTIAL FOR SUBORBITAL TRANSPORTATION: MASTERS 2008 FINAL REPORT 
105 (2008), available at http://isulibrary.isunet.edu/opac/doc_num.php?explnum_id=95 
(“From an operator’s perspective, it is nearly inevitable that an accident will occur, and 
companies will be sued.”); Paul Bertorelli, Space Tourism: Big Market, Big Risks, 
AVWEBINSIDER (Mar. 24, 2012), http://www.avweb.com/blogs/insider/AVWebInsider_
Spacetourism_206368-1.html (“Sooner or later, one of these operators will probably 
[suffer a catastrophic accident] and it’s more likely to happen the higher and faster you 
fly in untried machines.”). 
 9 The definition of liability in the context of outer space that Valérie Kayser 
adopted from Professor Bin Cheng’s scholarship is instructive: “[L]iability is often used 
specifically to denote the obligation to bear the consequences of a breach of a legal duty, 
in particular the obligation to make reparations for any damage caused, especially in 
the form of monetary payment.” VALÉRIE KAYSER, LAUNCHING SPACE OBJECTS: ISSUES 
OF LIABILITY AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 31 (2001) (quoting Bin Cheng, Article VI of the 
1967 Space Treaty Revisited: “International Responsibility,” “National Activities,” and 
“The Appropriate State”, 26:1 J. SPACE L. 7, 9 (1998) (internal quotations omitted). 
 10 See, e.g., Blake Gilson, Note, Defending Your Client’s Property Rights in 
Space: A Practical Guide for the Lunar Litigator, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1367, 1405 (2011) 
(arguing that litigation regarding lunar property would be uncertain); see generally 
Edward A. Dauer, Apology in the Aftermath of Injury: Colorado’s “I’m Sorry” Law, 34 
COLO. LAW. 47 (Apr. 2005) (discussing the upcoming difficulties in advance of a change in 
tort law); Bruce W. Foudree, The Year 2000 Problem and the Courts, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y, 515, 515, 527-28 (2000) (discussing the upcoming difficulties in anticipation of 
litigation related to the computer failures arising from the Y2K Millennium bug). 
 11 Several commercial spaceflight companies have announced the prices for their 
first passenger flights, all of which cost tens of thousands of dollars. Virgin Galactic charges 
$250,000 for its flights. Booking, VIRGIN GALACTIC, http://www.virgingalactic.com/booking/#
reservation_options (last visited Aug. 19, 2013). Space Adventures will charge $110,000 for its 
initial flights. Suborbital Spaceflight, SPACE ADVENTURES, http://www.spaceadventures.com/
index.cfm?fuseaction=suborbital.welcome (last visited Aug. 19, 2013). XCOR Aerospace 
will charge $95,000 for its initial flights. KLEINMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 26.  
2013] LIABILITY IN PRIVATE COMMERCIAL SPACEFLIGHT 293 
 
and the high net worths of the prospective spaceflight 
participants,12 legal action against a private commercial 
spaceflight company could result in million-dollar losses,13 
which could potentially bankrupt the company.14 Moreover, as 
a result of the relatively untested technology and risks 
involved,15 safety is a major concern. Indeed, approximately 
four percent of all people who have flown in space have 
perished.16 According to Virgin Galactic CEO Richard Branson, 
“a private program can’t afford to lose anybody.”17 
The anticipated problems of private commercial 
spaceflight are compounded by a statutory and regulatory regime 
that, even before any legal challenges have arisen,18 has been 
widely deemed unworkable.19 The existing system is a mishmash 
 
 12 Editorial, Space Law: A New Frontier for Commercial Law, METRO. CORP. 
COUNS., 35 (Nov. 7 2012), available at http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/articles/
21106/space-law-new-frontier-commercial-law; see generally James Pearn, Virgin Galactic 
Passenger List, J2P2, http://www.j2p2.com/virgin-galactic-passenger-list (last visited Aug. 
19, 2013) (listing entrepreneurs, CEOs, and celebrities as among the first passengers). 
 13 Arthur Piper, The Right Stuff: Barack Obama’s Enthusiasm for Expanding 
the Private Sector’s Role in Space Is Timely as Global Regulation Loosens, INT’L B. 
NEWS (Oct. 2010), available at http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=
3ED3E145-68CA-440F-B1B6-DF545BBC65A6. 
 14 See Leigh Buchanan, Richard Branson: “Screw It. Let’s Do It”, INC. MAG.( 
Oct. 31, 2012), available at http://www.inc.com/magazine/201211/leigh-buchanan/sir-
audacity-richard-branson.html. 
 15 “Spaceflight is an inherently risky endeavor. Harm can occur at every 
stage of flight.” KLEINMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 103-04 (detailing instances of death 
during the preflight, launch, and reentry phases, and also the possibility for harm to 
non-participants). See generally KAYSER, supra note 9, at 5-8. 
 16 Jeff Foust, Weighing the Risks of Human Spaceflight, SPACE REV. (July 21, 
2003), http://www.thespacereview.com/article/36/1. Former astronaut Rick Hauck 
explained his methodology for coming to this conclusion during a May 2003 address at 
the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC: 18 out of 
430 people who have flown in space died, including 14 on United States operated Space 
Shuttles, and four on Soviet Union operated Soyuz spacecraft. Id. Additionally the 
Space Shuttle program has had a “40% vehicular failure rate.” Carol Pinchefsky, 5 
Horrifying Facts You Didn’t Know About the Space Shuttle, FORBES (Apr. 18, 2012), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/carolpinchefsky/2012/04/18/5-horrifying-facts-you-didnt-
know-about-the-space-shuttle/ (explaining that two out of the total fleet of five Space 
Shuttles suffered fatal destruction). 
 17 Buchanan, supra note 14. 
 18 To be sure, lawsuits concerning events that relate to outer space have been 
litigated. However, they concerned matters such as the enforceability of liability 
waivers in satellite launch malfunction cases. See, e.g., Appalachian Ins. Co. v. 
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 214 Cal. App. 3d 1 (Ct. App. 1989); Martin Marietta Corp. v. 
Int’l Telecommc’ns Satellite Org., 991 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1992). Additionally, courts 
issued “opinions that address aerospace activities, among other contexts, in terms of 
contract, tort, property, patent, and even tax law.” Timothy M. Ravich, 2010: Space 
Law in the Sunshine State, 84 FLA. B.J. 25, 25 (2010) (citations omitted). 
 19 See, e.g., GÉRARDINE MEISHAN GOH, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT in 
INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW: A MULTI-DOOR COURTHOUSE FOR OUTER SPACE 3, 7 
(2007); Frans. G. von der Dunk, Too-Close Encounters of the Third-Party Kind: Will the 
Liability Convention Stand the Test of the Cosmos 2251-Iridium 33 Collision?, SPACE & 
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of international agreements, federal statutes and regulations, and 
state20 laws which combine to form an asynergistic regime that is 
simultaneously outdated and untested.21 
Accordingly, this note will argue that the current body 
of law governing private commercial spaceflight in the United 
States is structured in a manner that harms two seemingly 
inapposite but coterminous interests: (1) the ability of victims 
to recover damages, and (2) the healthy development of the 
commercial spaceflight industry. Instead of supporting those 
interests, the U.S. space law regime encourages short-term 
economic goals that are ultimately self-defeating. 
Space law is rooted in a victim-oriented tradition that 
dates back to its origins.22 Since then, the United States Congress 
has reaffirmed its obligations under international agreements to 
uphold those ideals as applied to private commercial spaceflight,23 
and high-ranking government officials have expressed their 
commitment to minimizing risks to individuals involved in these 
activities.24 Nevertheless, Congress, by leaving gaps in federal 
law, has constructively pushed states to pass limited liability 
statutes, which have the purpose of protecting spaceflight 
operators from lawsuits at the expense of potential victims. 
This represents, at the minimum, an abrogation of the 
longstanding victim-oriented approach that the U.S. pledged to 
uphold, and that other States have relied upon. Congress 
should pass legislation that removes limited liability. 
Additionally, limited liability statutes impair industry 
development.25 The commercial spaceflight industry must grow 
 
TELECOMMC’N. L. PROGRAM FAC. PUBLI’NS 199, 200, 205-06 (2010), available at 
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/spacelaw/28.  
 20 N.B. For the purposes of this note, the capitalized “State” refers to nation 
states, as traditionally used in the field of international relations. The uncapitalized 
“state” refers to one of the fifty federated states of the United States of America. 
 21 See Ravich, supra note 18, at 32 (“[A]erospace operators will require 
counsel to navigate them through the current patchwork of space law, i.e., dated 
international treaties, ‘soft law’ resolutions, different state laws, multiple executive 
national space policy statements, and conflicting government instructions and 
directives.”); see, e.g., von der Dunk, supra note 19, at 200, 205-06; Brian Weeden, 2009 
Iridium-Cosmos Collision Fact Sheet, SECURE WORLD FOUND. 2 (Nov. 10, 2010), 
available at http://swfound.org/media/6575/2009_iridium-cosmos_factsheet.pdf. 
 22 See infra Part I.B. 
 23 See infra Part I.B.2. 
 24 Subcommittee Examines FY13 FA Office of Commercial Space Transportation 
Budget Proposal, COMMITTEE SCI., SPACE, & TECH. (Mar. 20, 2012), http://science.house.gov/
press-release/subcommittee-examines-fy13-faa-office-commercial-space-transportation-
budget-proposal (citing statements from House Subcommittee Chairman Steven Palazzo 
and testimony from Federal Aviation Administration Associate Administrator for 
Commercial Space Transportation, Dr. George Nield). 
 25 See infra Part II. 
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beyond its current customer base of very high-net-worth 
individuals to realize long-term expansion and profitability. 
However, to support that growth, private commercial 
spaceflight companies must first create a track record of safe 
flights.26 The limited liability model inhibits this process by 
discouraging the risk-averse mass-market customer, thereby 
restricting the potential client base. This effectively mortgages 
the commercial spaceflight industry’s overall development to 
further the immediate needs of the space tourism business, which 
is a mere subset of the industry.27 As a result, other segments of 
private commercial spaceflight—like point-to-point operations,28 
which is projected to provide ultra-fast transportation between 
any locations on Earth in two hours29—suffer. 
Part I of this note gives an overview of the existing law 
relevant to private commercial spaceflight, and argues that there 
is overwhelming international agreement and a longstanding 
policy recognizing that victims of injuries arising from spaceflight 
should have mechanisms for recovery. While international law 
imposes some restrictions on U.S. policy, it is, on balance, only 
a minor factor. The key issue is deficiencies in federal statutes 
and regulations that permit states to pass limited liability 
laws. Part II argues that Congress should pass legislation 
preempting state limited liability statutes to satisfy the dual 
goals of preserving the victim-oriented heritage of international 
space law, and promoting the healthy and prolonged growth of 
the commercial spaceflight industry. In light of the increasing 
promulgation of state limited liability statutes, Congress must 
act quickly. 
 
 26 See von der Dunk, supra note 2, at 407. 
 27 For an overview of the different types of prospective businesses that 
encompass the commercial spaceflight industry, see von der Dunk, supra note 2, at 403-
10 (listing orbital space tourism, suborbital space tourism, suborbital private 
spaceflight, hotels in orbit, and private flights to the moon). 
 28 Point-to-point space transportation involves “climbing to an altitude 
outside of most of the atmosphere, maintaining a speed of Mach 5 to Mach 10 for a 
period of an hour or more, and then landing at a destination different from the launch 
point.” JACKSONVILLE AVIATION AUTHORITY, CECIL SPACEPORT MASTER PLAN (Draft) 1-2 
(Mar. 2012), available at http://www.flyjacksonville.com/Cecil/Spaceport/spaceport-mp.pdf. 
 29 Buchanan, supra note 14. 
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I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVATE COMMERCIAL 
SPACEFLIGHT LAW 
A. Overview 
Private commercial spaceflight in the United States is 
governed by international, federal, and state law.30 The 
overarching field of space law was first institutionally 
recognized by the international community in 1958 when the 
United Nations General Assembly created the Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space to address the legal issues in space 
activities.31 The United Nations originally formed the Committee 
on an ad hoc basis in response to the Soviet Union’s launch of 
Sputnik, the first artificial satellite placed into Earth’s orbit,32 
and soon converted it into a permanent committee.33 Following 
years of negotiations, the Committee recommended, and the 
United Nations unanimously voted to adopt, the landmark 
Outer Space Declaration of 1963.34 Most of that nonbinding 
resolution was formalized shortly thereafter by the ratification 
of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967,35 which has been described by 
commentators as “the foundation of . . . space law [that] . . . set 
the framework and cooperative tone . . . in outer space 
activities.”36 This landmark document was well-received by a 
 
 30 See generally R. BENDER, SPACE TRANSPORT LIABILITY: NATIONAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS, ch. 15, 279-353 (1995).  
 31 Vladimir Kopal, The Role of United Nations Declarations of Principles in 
the Progressive Development of Space Law, 16 J. SPACE L. 5, 5-6 (1988). 
 32 Brian Wessel, The Rule of Law in Outer Space: The Effects of Treaties and 
Nonbinding Agreements on International Space Law, 35 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 289, 290-91 (2012). 
 33 P.P.C. HAANAPPEL, THE LAW AND POLICY OF AIR SPACE AND OUTER SPACE: 
A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 8 n.43 (2003). 
 34 Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1962, U.N. GAOR, 18th Sess., Supp. No. 
15, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (Dec. 13, 1963), available at http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/
SpaceLaw/lpos.html; see Kopal, supra note 31, at 6-7 (“[T]he first legislative act . . . in 
the field of space law emerged as the 1963 Declaration . . . .”); see generally UNITED 
NATIONS TREATIES AND PRINCIPLES ON OUTER SPACE AND RELATED GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS v-vi (2002), available at http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/
pdf/publications/st_space_11rev2E.pdf. Several other events predate the Outer Space 
Declaration of 1963, which was the product of years of international cooperation. For a 
brief discussion on the work done by non-governmental organizations other than the 
United Nations, see Kopal, supra note 31, at n.6. 
 35 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 
18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty], reprinted in 
UNITED NATIONS TREATIES AND PRINCIPLES ON OUTER SPACE 3-8, supra note 34 . 
 36 THOMAS GANGALE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUTER SPACE: SOVEREIGNTY AND 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 50 (2009) (quoting the U.S. advisor to 
the United Nations Kenneth Hodgkins). 
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majority of the world, having been ratified by 101 States.37 
Indeed, the Outer Space Treaty is so widely accepted that it is 
part of customary international law,38 and may therefore apply 
even to countries that are not signatories.39 Accordingly, the 
“international community gives great weight to the commitments 
under the treaty and expects States to adhere to them.”40 
But by 1979, the “original euphoria”41 that fed the early 
development in the field had been “exhaust[ed],”42 and no 
additional space law treaties have come into force since.43 
Indeed, the last of these treaties, the Moon Agreement,44 has 
only been ratified by 13 States, none of which are major space 
powers.45 Accordingly, although the Moon Agreement “has 
frequently featured prominently in debates on international 
 
 37 Wessel, supra note 32, at 292. 
 38 “Customary international law [CIL] results from a general and consistent 
practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.” RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(2) (1987). The “conventional wisdom” is that 
customary international law “bind[s] nations with the same force as treaties.” Jack L. 
Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 1 (Law & 
Economics Working Paper No. 63 4 1998), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/
files/files/63.Goldsmith-Posner.pdf. Moreover, “[g]overnments take care to comply with 
CIL, . . . [n]ational courts apply CIL as a rule of decision, . . . [n]ations argue about 
whether certain acts violate CIL[, and] [v]iolations of CIL are grounds for war or an 
international claim.” Id. at 1.  
 39 KLEINMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 58; Wessel, supra note 32, at 297; see 
Andrei D. Terekhov, UN General Assembly Resolutions and Outer Space Law, 
Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law 97, 103 (1997), reprinted in 
SPACE LAW (Francis Lyall and Paul B. Laren eds., 2007). 
 40 KLEINMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 61. 
 41 Kopal, supra note 31, at 20. 
 42 Id. 
 43 See Timothy G. Nelson, The Moon Agreement and Private Enterprise: Lessons 
from Investment Law, 17 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 393, 394 (2011). Between 1967 and 
1979, United Nations member states ratified five treaties regarding outer space: 
Among the five core treaties adopted by the United Nations at the outset of 
the era of human spaceflight are the Treaty on Principles Governing the 
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space Including the 
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 
205; Convention on International Liability for Damages Caused by Space 
Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 961 U.N.T.S. 187; Agreement on the Rescue of 
Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched 
into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119; 
Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 14, 
1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 187; and Agreement Governing the 
Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Dec. 18, 1979, 
1363 U.S.T. 3. 
Ravich, supra note 18, at 32 n.1 (citations omitted); see also Wessel, supra note 32, at 
292-94. 
 44 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies, Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.S.T. 3 [hereinafter Moon Agreement], reprinted in 
UNITED NATIONS TREATIES AND PRINCIPLES ON OUTER SPACE 27-35, supra note 34 . 
 45 Wessel, supra note 32, at 293. 
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space law, it has not had a large practical impact”46 and is now 
considered to be “dormant.”47 
Following that period of progress, the United Nations 
General Assembly, in the absence of any meaningful 
international support for additional treaties,48 returned to 
passing declarations of principles.49 These declarations operate 
as “the first stage in the lawmaking process, serving as a basis 
for negotiating international agreements on the given subjects, 
and as an initial formulation of future provisions of the 
respective treaties.”50 They are not binding “and do not create 
norms of international law.”51 Nevertheless, those declarations 
are “generally followed by spacefaring nations and may have 
attained the status of customary international law, although 
this has not been tested judicially.”52 In all, there have been 
five declarations, the last of which was passed in 1996.53 
In 1984, the United States Congress, recognizing the 
need for “promoting the commercial space sector,”54 began 
“developing a framework for commercial space transportation.”55 
The federal legislative and regulatory system is incomplete,56 
however, and the five states most directly impacted by 
spaceflight have passed limited liability laws in order to fill 
gaps in the national structure.57 The last major holdout, 
California, finally relented in 2012.58 Today, almost every state 
 
 46 Id. at 293-94. 
 47 KLEINMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at xviii. 
 48 See P.J. Blount, Renovating Space: The Future of International Space Law, 
40 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 515, 524 (2012). 
 49 Wessel, supra note 32, at 294. 
 50 Kopal, supra note 31, at 19. 
 51 Terekhov, supra note 39, at 97. 
 52 KLEINMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 67. 
 53 See generally Terekhov, supra note 39, at 98-102. The five declarations, 
aside from the Outer Space Declaration of 1963, are Principles Governing the Use by 
States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Television Broadcasting, 
U.N. Res. 37/92 (Dec. 10, 1982); Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth 
from Outer Space, U.N. Res. 41/65 (Dec. 3, 1986); Principles Relevant to the Use of 
Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space, U.N. Res. 47/68 (Dec. 14, 1992); and 
Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space 
for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into Particular Account the 
Needs of Developing Countries U.N. Res. 51/122 (Dec. 13 1996). 
 54 KLEINMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 76. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Federal legislation does not address whether spaceflight companies are 
liable to flight crews, spaceflight participants or their heirs. Accordingly, those issues 
“must instead be addressed by [s]tate law . . . .” KLEINMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 107. 
 57 Those states—Virginia, Florida, New Mexico, Texas, and California—
either have institutional ties to government-sponsored spaceflight, or have attracted 
investment from the private commercial spaceflight industry. See infra Part I.C. 
 58 See Assemb. B. 2243, Ch. 416 (Cal. 2012); Joe Weichman, Remaining 
Competitive: Extending Spaceflight Protections 10 (May 2013), available at 
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with a strong interest in the development of commercial 
spaceflight has passed legislation on the matter.59 
B. International Law Foundations for the Victim-Oriented 
Approach of Commercial Spaceflight 
1.  The Outer Space Treaty60 
Referred to as a “constitution for outer space” by some 
commentators,61 the Outer Space Treaty was never truly 
intended to address commercial activity.62 It is well supported 
that the drafters were principally concerned with matters of 
global security, including the “prevention of the arms race in 
outer space.”63 Given the highly contentious nature of the Cold 
War era, it should come as no surprise that avoiding war took 
precedence.64 Nevertheless, commercial activity was “to a small 
extent envisioned . . . [and] [t]he idea of private actors was not 
completely ignored.”65 To that point, Article VI of the Outer 
Space Treaty provides in pertinent part that: 
Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for 
national activities in outer space . . . whether such activities are 
carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental 
entities, and for assuring that national activities are carried out in 
conformity with the provisions set forth in the present Treaty. The 
activities of non-governmental entities in outer space . . . shall 
require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate 
State Party to the Treaty.66 
Additionally, Article VII of the treaty provides that: 
 
http://www.makingitincalifornia.com/documents/Remaining%20Competitive%20-
%20Extending%20Spaceflight%20Protections.pdf. 
 59 See generally KLEINMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 107-10; Leonard David, 
Private Space Travel Gets a Big Boost in California, SPACE.COM (Sept. 21, 2012), 
http://www.space.com/17720-private-spaceflight-liability-california-law.html. 
 60 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 35. 
 61 Wessel, supra note 32, at 292 (quoting Helmet Tuerk, The Negotiation of 
the “Moon Agreement”, 52 PROC. COLLOQUIUM ON LAW OUTER SPACE 491, 493 (2010)). 
But see Ivan A. Vlasic, The Space Treaty: A Preliminary Evaluation, 55 CAL. L. REV. 
507, 508 (1967) (“The result is a document which expresses general principles in 
diverse areas but breaks very little new ground. It leaves unsolved a number of 
problems which urgently need legal regulation.”). 
 62 See generally Vlasic, supra note 61. It was meant to codify the Outer Space 
Declaration, which also did not concern private activity. KAYSER, supra note 9, at 37. 
 63 Vlasic, supra note 61, at 512; see, e.g., Blount, supra note 48, at 517-18. 
 64 Ravich, supra note 18, at 26. 
 65 Blount, supra note 48, at 518. 
 66 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 35, art. VI. 
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Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the 
launching of an object into outer space . . . and each State Party from 
whose territory or facility an object is launched, is internationally 
liable for damage to another State Party to the Treaty or to its 
natural or juridical persons by such object or its component parts on 
the Earth, in air space or in outer space . . . 67 
Remarkably, signatories of the treaty agreed to be 
responsible and liable68 for the actions of private actors under 
their governance for their space activities.69 Accordingly, 
Articles VI and VII serve to promote governmental regulation 
of private action because of, among other things, the risk of 
derivative liability.70 Given the high expense of spaceflight at 
the time,71 however, it was virtually unimaginable that any 
 
 67 Id. art. VII (emphasis added). 
 68 For an explanation of the difference between “responsibility” and 
“liability,” see KAYSER, supra note 9, at 31 (quoting Bin Cheng, Article VI of the 1967 
Space Treaty Revisited: “International Responsibility,” “National Activities,” and “The 
Appropriate State”, 26:1 J. SPACE L. 7, 9 (1998) (“‘Responsibility means 
essentially . . . answerability for one’s acts and omissions, . . . for their 
consequences, . . . for compliance with his or her legal duties, and for any breaches 
thereof . . . . [L]iability is . . . the obligation to bear the consequences of a breach of a 
legal duty, in particular the obligation to make reparation for any damage caused, 
especially in the form of a monetary payment.’”)). Professor Peter P.C. Haanappel 
analyzes the terms in the following manner: 
The English text of space law treaties and other texts uses the terms 
“responsibility” and “liability,” and the corresponding adjectives “responsible” 
and “liable.” Other languages, especially the Latin ones (such as French and 
Spanish) only have one term, from the same source as the English 
“responsibility.” It is submitted that where, taking English as a guideline, 
“responsibility” or “responsible” is used, this essentially means “to have a 
duty” (the debitum from Roman law); where “liability” or “liable” is used, this 
essentially means ‘to have an obligation to repair, to pay damanges (the 
obligatio from Roman law). 
HAANAPPEL, supra note 33, at 8 n.48. Other scholars note that “[t]he term 
‘responsibility’ has been variously defined, sometimes equated with and sometimes 
distinguished from the term ‘liability.’” BENDER, supra note 30, at 282. 
 69 Blount, supra note 48, at 518. 
 70 See Benjamin Perlman, Note, Grounding U.S. Commercial Space 
Regulation in the Constitution, 100 GEO L.J. 929, 934 (2012); see also Zhao Yun, A 
Legal Regime for Space Tourism: Creating Legal Certainty in Outer Space, 74 J. AIR L. 
& COM. 959 (2009).  
 71 Claude Lafleur, Costs of US Piloted Programs, SPACE REV. (Mar. 8, 2010), 
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1579/1. NASA’s Mercury program, which 
operated six flights from 1959 to 1963, cost the equivalent of $2.1 billion in 2013 
dollars, which equals $342.8 million per flight. Id. NASA’s Gemini program, which 
operated ten flights from 1962 to 1967, cost $9.1 billion in 2013 dollars, which equals 
$910.3 million per flight. Id. NASA’s Apollo program, which operated eleven flights 
from 1959 to 1973, cost $107.5 billion in 2013 dollars, which equals $9.8 billion per 
flight. Id. Finally NASA’s Space Shuttle program, which operated 134 flights from 1972 
to 2012, cost $198.6 billion in 2010 dollars, which equals $1.4 billion per flight. Id. All 
preceding 2013 dollar amounts were calculated using the US Inflation Calculator, a 
website that “uses the latest US government CPI [consumer price index] data 
published on Sept. 17, 2013 to adjust for inflation and calculate the cumulative 
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non-governmental entity could participate in space activity, at 
least for the foreseeable future. Lack of technical expertise 
notwithstanding, the average cost per flight in 1967, over $600 
million, would have been unaffordable.72 
While the treaty laid the groundwork for commercial 
space activity, there was no realistic possibility for that 
industry to emerge in the foreseeable future.73 Accordingly, the 
drafters had no reason to seriously consider addressing issues 
related to commercial spaceflight.74 Instead, the Outer Space 
Treaty should be understood to provide only general principles 
for subsequent lawmakers to rely and build upon.75 Most 
notably, the treaty does not address the key issues of 
enforceability and dispute resolution.76 
2. Convention on International Liability for Damage 
Caused by Space Objects of 1972 (Liability 
Convention)77 
The Liability Convention is an extension of Articles VI 
and VII of the Outer Space Treaty.78 As the five-year gap 
between the two treaties suggests, coming to an agreement 
regarding the specific legal issues addressed by the Liability 
Convention was a deliberate affair that required accounting for 
the differences among the drafters’ legal systems.79 There was a 
general consensus that the treaty was essential,80 but the 
 
inflation rate.” US INFLATION CALCULATOR, http://www.usinflationcalculator.com (last 
visited Oct. 6, 2013). During this time, cost was not an issue because the space program 
was viewed as a means to garner public support for the United States during the Cold 
War against the Soviet Union. Michio Kaku, The Cost of Space Exploration, FORBES 
(July 16, 2009), http://www.forbes.com/2009/07/16/apollo-moon-landing-anniversary-
opinions-contributors-cost-money.html. 
 72 The average price for the Mercury flights was $342.8 million, and the 
average price for the Gemini flights was $910.3 million, which, if averaged, gives an 
average flight cost of $626.6 million. See supra note 71. 
 73 GOH, supra note 19, at 163. 
 74 See Blount, supra note 48, at 518. 
 75 See BRUCE A. HURWITZ, STATE LIABILITY FOR OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH THE 1972 CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE 
CAUSED BY SPACE OBJECTS 9 (1992). 
 76 GOH, supra note 19, at 29. 
 77 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space 
Objects, Mar. 29 1972 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability 
Convention], reprinted in UNITED NATIONS TREATIES AND PRINCIPLES ON OUTER SPACE 
13-21, supra note 34 . 
 78 Liability Convention, supra note 77; see also KAYSER, supra note 9, at 33; 
HURWITZ, supra note 75, at 9. 
 79 See KAYSER, supra note 9, at 33. 
 80 HURWITZ, supra note 75, at 13. 
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necessary detailed legal work81 precluded a repeat of the speedy 
drafting process of the Outer Space Treaty.82 And although the 
spacefaring nations clearly had an interest in the matter, non-
space powers were also eager to bring about an agreement that 
would protect them in the event of accidents they believed were 
certain to arise.83 The final product reflected those concerns, 
and supports the view that the Liability Convention is “victim 
oriented.”84 Therefore, by ratifying the Convention, the United 
States implicitly recognized that activities in outer space, while 
important, are dangerous and must provide injured parties 
with a means for compensation.85 
To accomplish its framers’ victim-oriented goals, the 
Liability Convention sets forth a regime to govern liability for 
damage inflicted during space activities.86 The drafters 
expanded upon the Outer Space Treaty by clarifying formerly 
uncertain terms and ideas.87 Also, the Convention provides 
parties with a mechanism to adjudicate disputes and grant 
relief.88 Although it is arguable that the Liability Convention’s 
additions to the Outer Space Treaty have thus far not resulted in 
tangible, or even theoretical, benefits for victims,89 it nevertheless 
still represents the international community’s collective intent to 
“restore injured parties to their pre-accident condition.”90 
a. Damages 
Article I of the Liability Convention defines damages—a 
previously undefined term in space law—as the “loss of life, 
personal injury or other impairment of health; or loss of or 
damage to property of States or of persons, natural or juridical, 
or property of international intergovernmental organizations.”91 
In regard to personal injuries, Article I encapsulates both 
 
 81 See KAYSER, supra note 9, at 33. 
 82 See Vlasic, supra note 61, at 507. 
 83 See HURWITZ, supra note 75, at 10. 
 84 Id. at 9-10. 
 85 See generally id. at 10-11 (discussing the compensation scheme developed); 
see also KAYSER, supra note 9, at 47-52 (discussing the agreement among the 
international community that victims are entitled to means for recovery in incidents 
related to outer space activities). 
 86 Liability Convention, supra note 77; see also HURWITZ, supra note 75, at 9-
10; KAYSER, supra note 9, at 33. 
 87 See KAYSER, supra note 9, at 33. 
 88 Liability Convention, supra note 77. 
 89 See, e.g., GOH, supra note 19, at 2-3; von der Dunk, supra note 19, at 200, 
205-06. 
 90 BENDER, supra note 30, at 313. 
 91 Liability Convention, supra note 77. 
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direct damages—physical injuries and illnesses—and also 
indirect damages, such as lost wages, pain and suffering, and 
humiliation.92 While the treaty text does not explicitly include 
indirect damages in its definition of damages, most scholars 
agree that victims can recover for them.93 Indeed, allowing for 
recovery of indirect damages would comport with both the victim-
oriented heritage of outer space law,94 and also with other, similar 
international law.95 No similar debate exists regarding the 
comparatively straightforward area of both direct and indirect 
property damage.96 
b. Liability 
Next, the Convention addresses liability in several 
places. Article II provides that “[a] launching State shall be 
absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused by its 
space object on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft in flight.”97 
Article I, Section C defines launching State in four ways:  
 
(1) “[a] State which launches . . . a space object;”98  
(2) “[a] State which . . . procures the launching of a space object;”99  
(3) “[a] State from whose territory . . . a space object is launched;”100 
and  
(4) “[a] State from whose . . . facility a space object is launched.”101  
 
Additionally, “[t]he term ‘launching’ includes attempted 
launching.”102 Read together with Article VI of the Outer Space 
Treaty, under Article II of the Liability Convention, a 
 
 92 See KAYSER, supra note 9, at 47-49. 
 93 See, e.g., HURWITZ, supra note 75, at 13-16 (concluding that the Liability 
Convention governs indirect damages based upon analysis of legislative history and 
analogous international agreements); KAYSER, supra note 9, at 49-50 (arguing that the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties supports inclusion of indirect damages). But 
cf. BENDER, supra note 30, at 301-02 (arguing that “[a] knowledgeable United States 
commentator is . . . on record as stating the Liability Convention does not permit . . . 
indirect damages” and that international law generally allows for narrower recovery). 
 94 See HURWITZ, supra note 75, at 14-16. 
 95 See id. at 16-18 (cataloguing recognition of indirect damages in areas such 
as air law and nuclear energy law). 
 96 See KAYSER, supra note 9, at 47-49. 
 97 Liability Convention, supra note 77, art. II. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. This note will refer to those four definitions as being part of the launch, 
procurement, territory, and facility clauses, respectively. 
 102 Id. But this more expansive definition of launching may not survive a more 
probing analysis. For a detailed look at the potential inadequacy of the definition, see 
HURWITZ, supra note 75, at 20-21. 
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government is both internationally responsible and strictly 
liable for damages inflicted below Earth’s orbit103 by a private 
actor, such as a private commercial spaceflight company, so 
long as that government qualifies as a launching State.104 
While Article I, Section C makes it clear that a State is 
responsible for its own activities in space, when it comes to 
determining who is liable for damages arising out of private 
commercial spaceflight, the “launching State” designation can 
become a source of controversy.105 It is uncertain what private 
actions will trigger State liability under the procurement, 
territory, and facility clauses of Article I, Section C.106 
For instance, an expansive reading of the procurement 
clause would find that there is State liability even when its 
“nationals have [merely] financed or ordered the launching.”107 
Under this scenario, a private actor could be making his or her 
State liable “against its will.”108 Alternatively, it may be argued 
that no State “procures the launching” when a private company 
contracts with another private company for a space launch, but 
without any government involvement.109 
This issue also arises under the facility clause because 
of the advent of privately-owned spaceports,110 which calls into 
question whether they may legally be designated as State 
facilities.111 It is more settled, on the other hand, that when the 
facility is State-owned, liability is proper whether it is located 
in “foreign countries . . . outer space, on the high seas or the 
 
 103 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 35; Liability Convention, supra note 77. 
 104 von der Dunk, supra note 2, at 410. 
 105 See id. at 410-11. 
 106 Id. 
 107 HURWITZ, supra note 75, at 22. 
 108 Id. 
 109 See von der Dunk, supra note 2, at 411. 
 110 “A spaceport is the infrastructure at either the origin or destination of a 
spaceflight. It provides the essential infrastructure and related ground processing 
operations needed for space access as well as the facilities, organizations, and 
operations required to safely manage spaceflight.” ADVANCED SPACEPORT 
TECHNOLOGIES WORKING GROUP, BASELINE REPORT: CHARTING AMERICA’S PATH 
TOWARDS LOW-COST, ROUTINE ACCESS TO SPACE vii (Nov. 2003), available at 
http://weboflife.nasa.gov/shuttle/nexgen/Nexgen_Downloads/ASTWG/. “Many states 
have developed or are developing commercial spaceports, including New Mexico, 
Florida, Texas, Oklahoma, Virginia, Alaska, Colorado and California.” Partnerships to 
Advance the Business of Space: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, 
Science and Transportation, Subcommittee, 113th Cong. 3 (2013) (testimony of Capt. 
Michael Lopez-Algeria), available at http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/?a=
Files.Serve&File_id=18d37b64-c839-46f0-a443-aebf6e47c009. 
 111 See von der Dunk, supra note 2, at 411. 
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ocean floor, or in other territories outside the national 
jurisdiction of any State.”112 
Finally, the territory clause is relevant in regard to 
assigning liability for launches that occur in territories outside 
any jurisdiction, such as international waters.113 It is uncertain 
how the Liability Convention would apply to this type of launch 
because “[h]aving ‘territory’ in the international legal sense of 
the word is exclusively reserved for [S]tates.”114 In sum, as a 
result of the uncertainties arising from the launching State 
designation, it would be reasonable for “concerned [S]tates to 
exercise their national jurisdiction to control private 
spaceflight in an effort to guard against liability and any 
obligation to pay for the damage caused.”115 
Under the victim-oriented perspective of the 
Convention, the advantage of having these four definitions is 
clear: it gives an injured party more options for recovery.116 
Articles IV and V advance this objective by providing for joint and 
several liability for States that jointly launch a space object.117 
Moreover, Article V forecloses potential loopholes by declaring 
that “[a] State from whose territory or facility a space object is 
launched shall be regarded as a participant in a joint 
launching.”118 Accordingly, a State that permits use of its territory 
or facilities cannot escape liability under the Convention.119 
Additionally, the strict liability regime is justified on the 
grounds that the resulting damage will likely concern causes of 
action that are difficult to prove under a traditional negligence 
theory.120 Despite huge advances in the field, private commercial 
spaceflight is still in its infancy and dangerous, and the 
technologies involved are “shrouded in a web of secrecy.”121 The  
 112 HURWITZ, supra note 75, at 22. 
 113 See von der Dunk, supra note 2, at 411. Sea Launch is a private company 
that provides heavy lift launch services for commercial customers via Odyssey, a 
refurbished former oil drilling platform on the Pacific Ocean that now operates as a 
launch platform. Launch Platform Odyssey, SEA LAUNCH, http://www.sea-
launch.com/launch-q11142-Launch_Platform_iOdysseyi.aspx (last visited Aug. 19, 
2013). The company conducts launches from its Pacific Ocean location on the equator to 
take advantage of Earth’s increased rotation speed at its center, thereby increasing the 
amount of payload a satellite can carry. Justin Ray, Sea Launch Rocket Lofts TV Satellite 
Into Orbit, SPACE.COM (Aug. 19, 2012), http://www.space.com/17178-sea-launch-rocket-
satellite-success.html. 
 114 See von der Dunk, supra note 2, at 411 & n.42. 
 115 Id. at 411. 
 116 HURWITZ, supra note 75, at 22. 
 117 Liability Convention, supra note 77, art. IV. 
 118 Id. art. V. 
 119 See id. 
 120 See KAYSER, supra note 9, at 50-51. 
 121 See HURWITZ, supra note 75, at 28. 
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implications of this are two-fold. First, because injured parties 
will likely be unable to obtain the secret information, they will 
encounter unjustly burdensome difficulties in proving an 
otherwise meritorious case.122 Second, the industry is still 
untested, and there exists neither adequate legislative clarity 
nor jurisprudence to provide guidance to litigants regarding 
how to succeed in an outer space negligence suit.123 In sum, 
[strict] liability shows the maturity of society . . . [It] shows that 
society recognizes the benefits of technology and the fact that it 
cannot be regulated due to the many unknown dimensions involved 
with its development and exploitation. Yet, the overriding 
importance of the technology for society means that development 
must continue and therefore the danger is accepted under the 
condition that (a) the danger will, with time, fall to an acceptable 
(normal) level, and (b) until that time, the operator of the technology 
will be liable to pay compensation for damage caused by such a 
technology without the victim having to prove negligence.124 
In the end, the drafters determined that strict liability 
was appropriate given the danger involved both on Earth and 
in outer space.125 
In addition to supporting the imposition of strict 
liability, the dangerous nature of space activities also justifies 
the Convention not capping compensation recoverable against 
a launching State.126 To be sure, the negotiating States did 
consider a limit on compensation, but could not settle on an 
amount that was “sufficiently high to ensure that the victim 
would be fully compensated.”127 
Nevertheless, Article VI provides exceptions to strict 
liability in two limited situations.128 First, exoneration from 
strict liability may apply if the injured party acted with “gross 
negligence.”129 Second, if the injured party, “with intent to cause 
damage,” acted or failed to act, then exoneration may apply.130 In 
essence, this shifts the system to one that is more akin to fault 
liability.131 However, a launching State that failed to comport 
 
 122 See id. at 29. 
 123 See id.; see also supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 124 See HURWITZ, supra note 75, at 36 (alteration in original). 
 125 Id. at 28-29. 
 126 See KAYSER, supra note 9, at 51. 
 127 HURWITZ, supra note 75, at 56 (quoting 1969 U.N.Y.B 47) (discussing the 
expressions of the Argentina, Iran, and Lebanon delegations to the united nations). 
 128 Liability Convention, supra note 77, art. VI. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
 131 HURWITZ, supra note 75, at 41. 
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with relevant international law may be precluded from 
exercising that exemption.132 
The liability scheme also changes to common-law fault 
liability when damage is caused by one space object to another 
when both are in outer space.133 Article III of the Liability 
Convention provides that: 
In the event of damage being caused elsewhere than on the surface 
of the Earth to a space object of one launching State or to persons or 
property on board such a space object by a space object of another 
launching State, the latter shall be liable only if the damage is due 
to its fault or the fault of persons for whom it is responsible.134 
Because the drafters were predominantly concerned 
with non-commercial spaceflight,135 they intended for Article III 
to apply only to “a collision between space objects in outer 
space.”136 Moreover, the desire to protect victims that is 
expressed in other parts of the Convention137 is absent in 
Article III, which operates on the theory that all parties able to 
achieve spaceflight are sufficiently sophisticated to overcome the 
hurdles that impact non-space-faring parties.138 Additionally, 
they “have assumed the risks of conducting these activities: none 
should be a privileged victim.”139 Nevertheless, the launching 
State is still liable for the damages caused by those “persons for 
whom it is responsible.”140 Although that term is not explicitly 
defined,141 it may be inferred that certain parties who fall within 
the definitions set forth in Article I, Section C qualify.142 This 
means that even for damages caused by non-government actors in 
orbit and beyond, the State may be liable, albeit not absolutely.143 
Additionally, States can find some relief from liability in 
Article VII, which bars some individuals from bringing a claim 
under the Liability Convention.144  Specifically the Convention 
does not apply to “[f]oreign nationals during such time as they 
are participating in the operation of that space object . . . or 
 
 132 Liability Convention, supra note 77, art. VI. 
 133 See id. art. III. See supra note 3 (delineating when an object is in outer space). 
 134 Liability Convention, supra note 77, art. III. 
 135 See id.; GOH, supra note 19, at 163. 
 136 HURWITZ, supra note 75, at 32-33. 
 137 See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text. 
 138 See HURWITZ supra note 75, at 34. 
 139 See KAYSER, supra note 9, at 51. 
 140 Liability Convention, supra note 77, art. III. 
 141 HURWITZ, supra note 75, at 35. 
 142 See id.; Liability Convention, supra note 77, art. I(c). 
 143 Liability Convention, supra note 77, art. II-IV. 
 144 Id. art. VII. 
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during such time as they are in the immediate vicinity of a 
planned launching or recovery area as the result of an 
invitation by that launching State.”145 The drafters’ reasoning 
for this carve-out follows their Article III logic that a 
consenting party should not be given privileged victim status.146 
However, even in this situation, questions regarding the 
Convention’s applicability may arise in cases where foreign 
tourists become injured during a spaceport visit to observe launch 
activities.147 Given the trend toward making spaceports major 
tourist destinations,148 this could be a void in the international 
law field.149 In that situation, foreign nationals may simply bring 
suit outside of the provisions of the Liability Convention.150 
c. Dispute Resolution and Recovery 
The Liability Convention does not allow for a private 
cause of action.151 Instead, under Article VIII, the right to bring 
claims is exclusive to “[a] State which suffers damage, or whose 
natural or juridical persons suffer damage.”152 This means that 
in any incident, up to three States may have a cause of action: “the 
State where injury or damage occurs, the State of nationality of the 
individual victim(s), and the State of permanent residence of the 
individual victim(s).”153 Under this system, a hierarchy of 
decreasing priority prevents overlapping claims.154 Accordingly, the 
“[s]econd and third ranked States cannot present claims unless the 
preceding State chooses not to exercise its right to do so.”155 
Moreover, the claim must be presented to “a launching State.”156 
For a private spaceflight company, one of the most 
constraining aspects of the Liability Convention’s claim process 
is that it must rely on a State to bring a claim, or petition the 
State to act.157 Worse still is that the only proper target of a suit 
 
 145 Id. art. VII. 
 146 HURWITZ, supra note 75, at 44-46. 
 147 Id. 
 148 See Jesse McKinley, Spaceport America Eyes the (Near) Future, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 7, 2012), http://travel.nytimes.com/2012/09/09/travel/spaceport-america-eyes-the-
near-future.html (“[O]fficials say they expect to draw as many as 200,000 visitors a 
year to see the spaceport.”).  
 149 HURWITZ, supra note 75, at 44. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Liability Convention, supra note 77, art. VIII; von der Dunk, supra note 2, at 413. 
 152 Liability Convention, supra note 77, art. VIII. 
 153 HURWITZ, supra note 75, at 49. 
 154 Liability Convention, supra note 77, art. VIII. 
 155 HURWITZ, supra note 75, at 49. 
 156 Liability Convention, supra note 77, art. VIII. 
 157 See KAYSER, supra note 9, at 52-53; HURWITZ, supra note 75, at 50. 
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under this system is another State.158 Outside those options, 
the private spaceflight company has “neither any recourse nor 
accountability under the . . . Convention.”159 Further, because of 
the required involvement of State actors, the decision to bring suit 
is an inherently political decision with potential diplomatic 
ramifications.160 In fact, Article IX requires that claims be 
“presented to a launching State through diplomatic channels.”161 
The State action requirement is exacerbated by the one-year 
statute of limitations set forth in Article X.162 Although a time limit 
on the presentment of claims is not per se unreasonable,163 it 
certainly qualifies as a source of uncertainty for the private actor.164 
Even if the private company is able to persuade its 
government to bring a claim, the procedures set forth by the 
Convention are unwieldy and untested.165 Article XIV states 
that the dispute will be settled by a Claims Commission,166 a 
three-member, ad hoc, quasi-judicial body whose decisions are 
only “final and binding if the parties have so agreed.”167 Absent 
such an agreement, a decision is merely advisory.168 
Additionally, the Liability Convention does not provide for any 
meaningful procedural rules.169 Instead, Article XVI only directs 
that “the Commission shall determine its own procedure,”170 and 
that it “shall determine the place or places it shall sit and all 
other administrative matters.”171 Furthermore, if the suit is 
successful, there is no explicit requirement for the State to 
transfer its award to a victim.172 As a testament to the drafters’ 
own uncertainty over whether States would adopt the claims 
 
 158 Liability Convention, supra note 77, art. II-V. 
 159 Yun, supra note 70, at 966. 
 160 See HURWITZ, supra note 75, at 50-51. 
 161 Liability Convention, supra note 77, art. IX (emphasis added). 
 162 Id. art. X. 
 163 See GOH, supra note 19, at 37. 
 164 Id. 
 165 To date, no claims have been fully adjudicated via the Claims Commission 
procedures of the Liability Convention. Weeden, supra note 21, at 2. In fact, the 2009 
collision between a U.S. satellite, the Iridium 33, and a Russian satellite, the Cosmos 
2251, which seemed to present a storybook opportunity to test the Liability 
Convention, had its one-year statute of limitation under the Liability Convention pass 
without any party bringing a claim. Id. 
 166 Liability Convention, supra note 77, art. XIV. 
 167 Id. art. XIX. As the Brazilian delegation to the United Nations astutely 
observed, “it was doubtful that a provision in any convention would become binding 
merely because it was said to be binding.” HURWITZ, supra note 75, at 59. 
 168 GOH, supra note 19, at 38. 
 169 Liability Convention, supra note 77. 
 170 Id. art. XVI. 
 171 Id. 
 172 HURWITZ, supra note 75, at 50. 
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procedures, Article XI does “not require the prior exhaustion of 
any local remedies,” nor does it “prevent a State, or natural or 
juridical persons it might represent, from pursuing a claim in 
the courts or administrative tribunals or agencies of a 
launching State.”173 
3. The International Community’s Collective Intent 
The Outer Space Treaty and Liability Convention, read 
in conjunction, illustrate a major tenet of existing international 
space law that must translate into commercial space law as 
well: the State has obligations to uphold, including maintaining 
the victim-oriented system that it has supported for decades.174 
As applied to commercial spaceflight, that means a State should, 
at a minimum, recognize the fault liability regime, if not a strict 
liability regime, and also the possibility of recovery for indirect 
damages.175 Additionally, as the lack of use and the confusing 
rules of the Liability Convention’s claims process make clear, 
that portion of the treaty’s relevance in the commercial realm is 
questionable.176 Accordingly, it is proper for the State to take a 
more direct approach in regard to adjudicating disputes,177 
while still adhering to the victim-oriented tradition established 
in international law. 
C. United States Federal Law Continues the Victim-
Oriented Tradition 
1. Commercial Space Launch Act (Launch Act)178 
Prior to 1984, no agency was explicitly authorized to 
regulate private commercial spaceflight.179 The example of 
Space Services, Inc. is instructive. In its successful efforts to 
achieve the first launch of a space object by an American 
company without direct government participation, Space 
Services negotiated with over a dozen federal agencies over a 
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period of six months180 to gain government approval.181 Among 
other agencies, NASA, the Coast Guard, Central Intelligence 
Agency, Department of Defense, Department of State, Federal 
Aviation Administration, Federal Communications Commission, 
and Internal Revenue Service all had a hand in regulating a 
private launch.182 The process was slow, unpredictable, 
expensive, and not conducive to smooth business operation.183 
Accordingly, Congress passed the Launch Act in 1984 to 
promote the commercial spaceflight industry.184 Additionally, it 
sought to simultaneously develop a system to protect the 
public, principally via the licensing of spaceflight operators.185 
Moreover, Congress intended to create a favorable climate for 
private actors by dramatically cutting down on bureaucratic 
hurdles and centralizing all authority to regulating the commercial 
spaceflight industry to the Secretary of Transportation.186 To that 
end, Congress granted the Secretary of Transportation oversight of 
the recently created Office of Commercial Space Transportation187 
and control over licensing agreements with private actors.188 
Nevertheless, the Secretary must act in a manner that is 
“consistent with any obligation assumed by the United States 
in any treaty, convention, or agreement that may be in force 
between the United States and any foreign nation.”189 
Congress subsequently amended the Launch Act in 
1988 to reflect “the necessity [of compensating] individuals for 
damages incurred in the course of space exploration.”190 Under 
the updated statute, there is a three-tier risk allocation 
structure191 that creates a guaranteed government fund in the 
event that private insurance is insufficient to cover all of the 
damages.192 In the first tier, a private spaceflight operator is 
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liable up to its maximum probable loss, a case-by-case 
determination “capped at $500 million in 1988 dollars [that is] 
adjusted for inflation.”193 Compensation in excess of the 
maximum probable loss is governed by the second tier, which is 
paid through a public fund maintained by the federal 
government.194 Under the third tier, once liability exceeds $2 
billion in 1988 dollars, the private actor is again responsible for 
payment.195 In doing so, Congress effectively protects private 
actors from unlimited liability via its allocation of up to $1.5 
billion toward damages.196 
This addresses one of the chief criticisms of the Liability 
Convention—the lack of a cap on compensation—although the 
State is still subject to unlimited liability.197 By agreeing to the 
creation of the second tier of repayment, however, “[t]he United 
States has . . . committed itself to pay for negligence claims to 
which it was not even a party.”198 This practice comports with 
the victim-oriented view of space law originally espoused by the 
Liability Convention, and represents a tacit agreement to its 
ideals by the United States Congress while still promoting 
private development. Indeed, “[i]n the interconnected world of 
the twenty-first century, the ‘one-nation-go-it-alone’ model . . . is 
becoming increasingly anachronistic.”199 
2. Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004 
(CSLAA)200 
Congress’s passage of the Commercial Space Launch 
Amendments Act of 2004201 signaled to aerospace companies 
that the federal government supported the efforts of the private 
sector to carry passengers into space.202 Specifically, the CSLAA 
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“authorized private individuals to pay for, and commercial 
space entities to provide, space travel.”203 
The CSLAA imposes only minimal requirements on 
space flight participants,204 the most important of which, 
arguably, is that they give “written informed consent.”205 The 
CSLAA’s requirement for informed consent is a logical 
extension of the Launch Act’s licensing scheme in that both 
operate as preventative measures that attempt to improve 
safety.206 Because of the multitude of risks associated with 
space travel,207 it is reasonable to assume that the required 
waivers will be exceedingly comprehensive and cautiously 
drafted to avoid liability.208 Indeed, some spaceflight operators 
will go to extreme lengths to demonstrate the validity of 
waivers. For example, Space Adventures, the “first and only 
company”209 to have sent non-astronauts into space, explicitly 
includes a “waiver signing ceremony” in its default suborbital 
spaceflight itinerary.210 
3. The U.S. Congress’s Failure to Act 
The Launch Act and CSLAA continue where the Outer 
Space Treaty and the Liability Convention leave off by 
addressing unresolved issues in commercial spaceflight and 
liability. Additionally, Congress crafted legislation that maintains 
the spirit of those two treaties by providing for a fund that 
supplements the insurance requirements while simultaneously 
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addressing unlimited liability for private actors.211 But in failing 
to specifically address liability for amounts less than $500 
million and more than $2 billion in the CSLAA, Congress has 
ceded the issue to the states.212 This inaction, when combined 
with the various states’ limited liability statutes,213 represents 
a symbolic derogation of the United States’ preexisting 
obligation under the Liability Convention to allow for victims 
to recover from harm.214 
D. State Limited Liability Statutes Are Contrary to the 
Victim-Oriented Regime 
Because spaceflight operators are still liable for an 
amount up to the maximum probable loss, states have passed 
limited liability statutes completely absolving spaceflight 
operators from liability, in a race to the bottom.215 As a 
supplement to the federal requirement for waivers, several 
states have passed laws limiting the liability of companies 
offering human spaceflight services.216 Fittingly, those states—
Virginia,217 Florida,218 New Mexico,219 Texas,220 and California221 
(collectively, the “space states”)—also tend to have privately 
funded and operated spaceports.222 Additionally, businesses 
have proposed to build spaceports in Alabama, Washington, 
Hawaii, Wisconsin, Wyoming, Indiana, and multiple locations 
in Texas,223 all of which are the headquarters, states of 
incorporation, or anticipated expansion sites of the major 
private spaceflight companies.224 The motivation is clear: 
companies with existing space operations want limited liability 
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protection.225 States rightly believe that they can attract private 
operators by passing limited liability laws.226 
In broadly analyzing the five state statutes, it is 
apparent that they share many similarities with only minor 
differences.227 Each state specifies the necessary language that 
a waiver must contain to limit a spaceflight operator’s liability, 
as per the CLSAA’s requirement.228 And while the statutes all 
limit liability, none of them exempt gross negligence or 
intentional torts.229 In fact, Florida, New Mexico, and California 
also include carve-outs for when the operator had “actual 
knowledge” or “should have known” of the danger.230 
As a result of most states not having limited liability 
laws, choice of law issues will likely apply in the event of a 
spaceflight accident.231 Nevertheless, a majority of jurisdictions 
in the United States generally enforce exculpatory clauses.232 
Therefore, even if a plaintiff can win on the choice of law issue, 
and convince a court to apply the law of a jurisdiction other 
than the state of contract formation, the plaintiff may still lose 
on the merits.233 This is because courts will likely treat the 
spaceflight industry more like expeditions to Mount Everest or 
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Antarctica and less like the commercial airline industry, and 
bar recovery against operators.234 
Despite differences between the states’ various limited 
liability statutes and enforcement, their very existence goes 
against the principles and ideals set forth in the Liability 
Convention and Launch Act.235 As a general matter, the state 
laws bar a plaintiff from recovery once they have been informed 
of the risk and consented to be a spaceflight participant.236 A 
provision of that sort is absent from the Liability Convention, 
which recognizes only strict and common-law fault liability.237 
Even when the Convention refuses to grant “privileged victim” 
status on the theory that a party has assumed the risk of 
spaceflight, fault liability, at a minimum, still applies.238 The 
space states, in their attempt to promote business development, 
have acted against the shared international ideals that the 
United States, via Congress, agreed to.239 
II. FEDERAL PREEMPTION AS A MEANS TO COMPENSATE 
VICTIMS AND FOCUS INDUSTRY GROWTH 
The current system of international, federal, and state 
law should ideally operate to promote two goals. First, the 
international and United States systems of space law should 
ensure that victims of spaceflight accidents are properly 
compensated for the damages they suffer.240 Second, the U.S. 
federal and state systems of space law should encourage the 
growth of commercial spaceflight operations.241 
On its face, victim compensation and business growth 
seem to be not only incompatible goals, but polar opposites. 
Indeed, if the short-term economic gains that are to be achieved 
through space tourism are the goal, then that assessment is 
likely correct. Current space tourism, which only consists of 
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sending customers on a short two-hour trip to the lower fringes 
of outer space with a return to the original launch site,242 
benefits from laws that limit liability.243 Those flights are more 
akin to extreme sports,244 which are generally immune from 
lawsuits when participants sign waivers.245 Moreover, it is 
inarguable that those individual companies have an interest in 
limiting their financial liability if at all possible. 
But focusing so closely on crafting a legislative regime 
that supports only this type of space tourism specifically, and 
not commercial spaceflight generally,246 is a gamble. By 
allowing for limited liability, the United States risks being 
burdened with an inflexible statutory structure that may no 
longer support the originally intended business model. If space 
tourism is the only prospective use of the technologies being 
developed, then it is perhaps conceivable to maintain the limited 
liability system. That is not the case, however. To wit, emerging 
technologies, including point-to-point transport, hotels in outer 
space, and long-distance voyages, are currently under 
development, all of which envision different goals and require 
different governmental intervention.247 In fact, analysts speculate 
that they may “eventually even supplant” the space tourism 
market.248 In this scenario, because those activities also 
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encompass the universe of private commercial spaceflight, it may 
be necessary to dismantle the limited liability model and attempt 
to impose an alternative that better reflects the direction of the 
industry.249 Imposing a system of law so focused on just one 
facet of the industry, and potentially at the expense of the 
others, is ill-advised. 
Regardless which of these emerging technologies 
develops first, the industry must prioritize safety in order to 
achieve marketplace success.250 As then-Virgin Galactic 
President Will Whitehorn explained, his company’s goal with 
its space tourism business is to first establish a safety record of 
no more than one accident per 50,000 flights, which would 
represent a statistic on par with the commercial airline 
industry.251 After accomplishing that goal, Virgin can then 
transition to offering point-to-point flights,252 presumably 
because they view it as a profitable enterprise.253 Additionally, 
this system of flights could find acceptance in the cargo 
transport industry and by the U.S. military,254 markets that 
space tourism cannot fill. At Virgin’s current expected rate of 
progress, however, it will take decades to log the number of 
flights necessary to institute an ideal safety record.255  
Accordingly, space tourism companies should increase 
the amount of flights they offer to more quickly reach the goal 
of offering point to point flights. Beyond demonstrating safety, 
they must simultaneously dispel the perception that their 
product is reserved for the wealthy, and build mass market 
appeal. However, making more flights available is counter-
productive if there are not enough people to fill the seats. As it 
stands, market research shows that today’s dominant potential 
customer base is predominantly male, in his mid-fifties, and 
wealthy.256 But if ticket prices decrease, more people will be 
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increasingly willing to travel, thereby expanding the market.257 
Although it seems counterintuitive, for spaceflight to reach 
that wider audience, the industry must reduce prices, shed its 
playboy status, and become boring, mundane, and safe.258 
State limited liability statutes may therefore be more 
acceptable if the only issue was promoting space tourism at the 
expense of properly informed and consenting participants. 
Advocates of that position would still need to justify 
circumventing the United States’ international obligations 
under the ideals of the Outer Space Treaty and the Liability 
Convention, but the position may nevertheless be defensible in 
the interest of economic development. However, the space 
states are focused on crafting a narrow response to a singular 
issue—space tourism—whereas there exists an entire 
commercial spaceflight industry that encompasses several 
different, but related sectors. That means those limited liability 
statutes may have the actual effect of hurting the industry. By 
taking away a potential plaintiff ’s ability to bring suit, the 
states are foreclosing a class of customers, the risk-averse, to 
the spaceflight industry. This also necessarily lessens a 
company’s ability to create a track record of safety, thereby 
slowing the path to the potentially more profitable mass 
market,259 and a more diversified private commercial spaceflight 
business. Because the states’ limited liability statutes arguably 
impact both victims and the spaceflight companies negatively, 
Congress should enact national standards that disallow their 
existence. 
Because the space states are all self-interested in 
attracting businesses, it is unrealistic to expect that they will 
unilaterally repeal their limited liability statutes,260 
particularly because some of those businesses are arguably 
committed solely to remaining space tourism companies.261 In 
this sense, the states and those companies are similar in that 
they are willing to benefit at the expense of an overarching goal. 
The states wish to enrich themselves in favor of national and 
international goals, and the dedicated space tourism companies 
wish to enrich themselves in favor of the continued healthy 
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growth of the industry at large. Accordingly, federal preemption 
is the most sensible solution in that it has the ability to be 
sufficiently far-seeing to ignore those short-term interests. 
Regardless of the plan that Congress adopts, it must, at 
a minimum, modify or eliminate the limited liability spaceflight 
statues as they currently exist in the space states. As a starting 
point, Congress may consider amending the Launch Act’s three 
tier recovery system by lowering the first tier damage cap of 
$500 million to an amount that would adequately compensate a 
victim, but would not bankrupt a spaceflight company. As a 
supplement to that, Congress could create an “obligatory 
insurance regime, or [a national] compensation fund” supported 
by fees collected from private parties.262 
Even if Congress does not accept the premise that 
eliminating limited liability is in the country’s best interests, a 
uniform national law would provide certainty for commercial 
spaceflight companies. As the commercial spaceflight industry 
continues to develop and mature, the necessity of implementing 
changes to the current legislative regime will only grow. If the 
United States is to remain the leader in outer space activities, 
Congress must act sooner, rather than later. 
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